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CHAPTER 10 
Conflict of Laws 
ALEXANDER NEKAM 
§IO.l. Reiidence and "changed circumstances" in custody juris-
diction. Among the cases decided by the Supreme Judicial Court 
within the 1955 SURVEY year only a few contained conflict elements 
and fewer still can be said to have presented new problems. The 
most interesting among these is Aufiero v. Aufiero,! a controversial 
decision concerning custody of a minor child. 
. Problems of custody are, today, among the most perplexing in the 
field of conflicts. The law itself remains, in many ways, confused, but 
its application often seems arbitrary well beyond what such confusion 
would explain. As if the legal parochialism which in the past has 
made the law of conflicts so slow to emerge were offering its last 
determined stand here, decisions often seem to have been dictated by 
one fundamental consideration only - that of keeping the child at all 
costs within the state of the forum. 
Courts, too, tend to favor what is nearer to them and to consider 
the familiar as being the best: such inclinations are deeply human and 
they should hardly surprise us. What may be a surprise is how easily, 
for various reasons, in the field of custody, the courts are able to satisfy 
these inclinations. 
One of the reasons has to do with the h.a_sis of jurisdiction in these 
matters. Custody often being considerea a status problem, jurisdic-
tion usually will be said to depend on QQmicile: the very reason, in-
deed, for people talking in terms of status is their feeling that the 
relation in question should come under the domiciliary law. Yet 
there are particular difficulties in applying domicile as the basis of 
jurisdiction to custody. It is in its application to minor children 
that domicile becomes the most technical, and the divorce of the par-
ents of the child as well as the events following it may easily be inter-
preted as changing these technical prerequisites. The very award 
determining the child's custody may be instrumental in changing 
domicile and in thus giving jurisdiction, from then on, to another 
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court; the incidental dispositions of the award, like the rights of visita-
tion granted, may easily be interpreted the same way. One sometimes 
feels as if, in custody matters, it were not jurisdiction which depended 
on domicile, but domicile on a court having assumed jurisdiction. 
Finding domicile an often unsatisfactory criterion, many states have 
turned to residence as an alternative basis of custody jurisdiction; 
Massachusetts is one of these states.2 Whatever otherwise the merits 
of such a change, the possibility of locally centered decisions certainly 
is only facilitated thereby: if domicile already could, for this purpose, 
be manipulated, the manipulation of the term residence appears even 
easier. 
Another source of discretion lies in the conditional character of all 
custody regulations. They are the result of changing considerations, 
of evaluating the opposing claims of the parents and of determining 
the best interests of the child; they must therefore be allowed to 
\ change with every material change influencing these factors. What 
change does, however, qualify as material is presently left entirely to 
the evaluation of the forum. Some change in every case there always 
can be found - if nothing else, the change caused by the chiI5!'§_Rllysi-
cal presence within the jurisdiction; any such change, it necessary, 
the forum might call material and thereby justify the imposition of its 
own solutions. Full faith and credit probably could be used by the 
Supreme Court of the United States as imposing some check on the 
complete liberty the courts in this field now exercise. So far, however, 
the Supreme Court has not squarely faced this issue. 
It is against this background that the Aufiero decision has to be 
considered. Father and mother and their three-year-old child were 
domiciled in New York and lived there with the father's parents 
when, in 1949, the wife left her husband and returned to the home of 
her parents in Massachusetts. She left the child with the father and 
thereafter saw her only occasionally. In 1952 the father obtained a 
\ divorce in Nevada, and the Nevada court awarded the custody of the 
child to the father's parents with whom at that time she still con-
tinued to live. Throughout these Nevada proceedings the wife was 
_ represented through attorney. Immediately after the divorce the fa-
ther returned to live in New York and in May of the same year he 
remarried. The mother thereupon brought a petition for habeas 
corpus in the competent court in New York to secure possession of 
the child. On the day set for hearing, the case was continued until 
September and a stipulation was signed by the parties and made part 
{. of the record to the effect that the mother might take the child with 
her to Massachusetts for three weeks. When the three-week period 
expired the mother, in violation both of the stipulation and of the 
terms of the Nevada decree~ d!ELg~t_l"~turn the child but brought 
proceedings in the Probate Court in Massachusetts to obtain custody. 
2 G.L., c. 208, §29, as construed in Bergeron v. Bergeron, 287 Mass. 524, 192 N.E. 
86 (1934). 
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The father and his parents, on their part, brought habeas corpus 
proceedings in the same court to regain possession of the child. 
The Probate Court found that the child was resident in the county 
where her mother lived, that she had made a happy adjustment to 
her new home there, and that her happiness and weifare would best 
be served by giving her custody to the mother. A decree was entered 
accordingly. 
On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court was forced to admit, under 
the doctrine of Sherrer v. Sherrer} that the Nevada divorce of the 
parents, both parties having been represented there, was entitled to 
full faith and credit in Massachusetts. It also had to assume that the 
custody provisions of the decree were valid, the theory of May v. 
A nderson4 concerning divisible divorce applying only to ex parte pro-
ceedings. Nonetheless the Court affirmed the decree of the Probate 
Court. Though it found it to be plain that the child had no domicile 
in Massachusetts, it thought that the lower court could have found 
. that it was a resident there and also that there had been a matetial 
change in the situation since the Nevada decree. The reasons~fC;~-the 
separation of the parents were held by the Court to have been im-
material, as was the misconduct of the mother in failing to return the 
child to New York. 
One may readily admit that the residence of the child within the 
jurisdiction, if established, will be a good basis for exercising custody 
jurisdiction, and similarly that full faith and credit does not neces-
sarily require the giving of full effect to the previous decree. One 
may perhaps also admit that the welfare of the child is so important 
a consideration that, if it is secured, an illegal act bringing about its 
presence may well be overlooked. Yet one still must be perturbed 
I by the decision because of the artificial factual evaluations which 
. underlie the application of these principles. 
In justifying the finding of the child's Massachusetts residence, the 
Court held that she was not merely a traveler passing through the 
territory, not a usual temporary visitor, but one living "in a relation-
ship which those in actual control of her intended to make perma-
nent if they could." Hardly could there be a predication of "resi-
dence" on thinner ground, unless residence is simply equated with 
presence. As a practical matter, the argument does equate the two, 
because the additional requirement of the intention on the part of 
those in actual control is but another way of saying that these people 
were asking for the custody of the child. 
Nor is the Court's findings of intervening changes very convincing 
unless one is prepared to accept the change of its physical presence 
into Massachusetts as one which in itself is material enough. The 
child now lives, relates the Court, "in a modest, well-kept house of five 
3320 Mass. 351, 69 N.E.2d 801 (1946), rev'd, 334 U.S. 343, 68 Sup. Ct. 1087, 92 
L. Ed. 1429, 1 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1948). 
4345 U.S. 528, 73 Sup. Ct. 840, 97 L. Ed. 1221 (1953). 
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rooms in a neighborhood of small houses"; in New York "she would 
be obliged to live in the city in an apartment or tenement located in a 
large building of many stories composed of similar apartments or 
tenements." This argument seems rather inconclusive. It could, 
with the appropriate change in embellishing adjectives, just as well be 
used the other way round. In Massachusetts, the Court continues, the ' 
child will live with her mother and the parents of the mother, while 
it is problematical how much attention the father would pay to the 
child in New York and how often she could see him, he having mean-
while remarried and living no longer with his parents. The father's re-
marriage may constitute a significant change, but possibly more as an 
additional argument upholding the original decree than one against 
it. He may have remarried in order to provide the child with a 
home more suitable and with one of his own. In any case its evalua-
tion would better be left to the courts of New York. 
The decision seems, from every point of view, highly unsatisfactory. 
Custody was awarded to the mother in spite of the fact that it was she 
who, for years, had abandoned father and child, that the divorce was 
awarded to the husband, that in the proceedings resulting in the origi-
nal custody decree both parties were represented, and in spite of the fact 
that the retention of the child was against the express provisions of 
the stipulation entered into a few weeks earlier by the mother. The 
case was decided on the basis of factual findings, both as to residence 
and as to changed circumstances, which seem unconvincing and purely 
formal. In effect the decision seems to mean that custody problems 
between the states will be solved on the basis of local interest and 
power. It reminds one of what Justices Jackson and Reed said in 
their dissent in May v. Anderson5-of possession apparently being, in 
custody cases, not merely nine points of the law but all of them and of 
self-help being therefore the ultimate authority in these matters. 
The consequence of the decision will be to make courts of other 
states reluctant to allow children under local custody to be taken, 
even temporarily, into Massachusetts, as no safeguard can be devised 
which could guarantee their return. It will thus penalize the Massa-
chusetts parent of such a child in cutting down his visiting rights. 
But it will also penalize the child himself. The decision, though di-
rected toward achieving the child's welfare and happiness, seems to 
ignore the most important need the child may have, the need for 
stability. Stability in these matters, within the framework of the 
Union, can be achieved only through some acceptance of full faith 
and credit. With the determinations of the state courts concerning 
domicile or residence the Supreme Court probably can do nothing; 
but it could insist on standards which, under full faith and credit, it 
will require in order to accept the materiality of a change. 
§lO.2. The Sherrer doctrine: Full faith and credit and divorce de-
crees. The doctrine of Sherrer v. Sherrer came up, with some slight 
5345 U.S. at 539, 73 Sup. Ct. at 816, 97 L. Ed. at 1230. 
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variations, in another case during the 1955 SURVEY year. In Chittick 
v. Chittick1 petitioner asked for separate support under G.L., c. 209, 
§32, and the defense was a decree of divorce awarded to her against 
respondent by the District Court of the Virgin Islands in 1952. 
Granting that petitioner could not maintain this proceeding if she was 
not the wife of respondent, the judge of probate nonetheless entered 
a decree for her support. He ruled the divorce to be void because 
neither of the parties had acquired a domicile in the Virgin Islands 
and because the divorce was the result of "fraud and collusion" be-
tween them. 
On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court reversed. Though it found 
that the evidence before the judge of probate supported his finding 
as to domicile, it held that under the Sherrer doctrine the judge was 
not free to find as he did. The present petitioner appeared in person 
before the Virgin Islands court and the present respondent was rep-
resented there by his attorney; the findings therefore of that court that 
plaintiff was domiciled in the Virgin Islands became binding upon 
both parties and the decision can no longer, under full faith and credit, 
coIIaterally be attacked on jurisdictional gTounds. Whether the allega-
tions of fraud and collusion refer to jurisdiction or to the merits of the 
divorce, they are of no avail to the parties: their participation in the 
proceedings precludes an attack on jurisdiction and the fact that they 
thus cannot deny the jurisdiction of the Virgin Islands court also pre-
cludes an attack on the merits. 
Except for the fact that here the defendant to the divorce proceed-
ing did not appear in person but was represented by his attorney, 
the case is on all fours with Coe v. Coe. 2 The Massachusetts Court 
therefore followed that decision, though it expressed its disapproval 
of having to accept even the Virgin Islands "as fully accredited to 
engage in the business of interfering with domestic relations in all the 
other jurisdictions throughout this great country." 
§lO.3. Service of process on foreign businesses. Concerning the 
legislative activity of the year covered, one amendment should be 
mentioned. Section 5 of Chapter 227 of the General Laws pro-
vides that every individual not an inhabitant of Massachusetts and 
every partnership composed of persons who are not such inhabitants, 
having a usual place of business in the Commonwealth or engaged 
there in certain types of construction business shall, before doing 
business in the Commonwealth, appoint in writing a resident to be its 
agent for the purpose of receiving service of process and shall file a 
copy of such power of attorney in the office of the State Secretary. In 
case of such individual or partnership neglecting or refusing to ap-
point such an agent, the last sentence of Section 5 provided that the 
State Secretary should notify it of the requirements of this section and 
§1O.2. 11955 Mass. Adv. Sh. 527, 126 N.E.2d 495. 
2334 U.S. 378, 68 Sup. Ct. 1094, 92 L. Ed. 1451 (1948). 
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that any person acting as its agent after such notification should be 
liable to a daily fine. 
This last sentence of Section 5 has now been amended1 to the effect 
that if such an individual or partnership shall fail to appoint an agent 
for the purpose of receiving service of process and, nonetheless, does 
business within the Commonwealth, service of process may be made 
upon the State Secretary, who will then give proper notice to the 
defendant of the action. 
These being cases where the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts courts 
would not be based upon personal service but upon contact through 
pursuing activities of a certain type, and the requirement of notice 
being adequately taken care of, the amendment does not seem to vio-
late any standards of due process required by the Supreme Court. 
§IO.4. The Erie doctrine and the manner of determination of state 
law. To the matters we have been discussing, we may add an inter-
esting point raised in Lee-Wilson, Inc. v. General Electric Co.,1 a recent 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 
It is an interpretation of the Erie doctrine and as such of importance 
in every field of the law, including the law of conflicts. The case 
came up on appeal from the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts which in a diversity case granted an application 
for preliminary injunction enjoining the selling of certain merchan-
dise at less than the minimum "fair trade" prices established pursuant 
to the Massachusetts Fair Trade Law (G.L., c. 93, §§14A-14D). Hold-
ing that the District Court did not commit an abuse of discretion in 
refusing to withhold a preliminary injunction on the ground that the 
state statute was probably in violation of the Declaration of Rights 
in the Massachusetts Constitution, the Court of Appeals added: "In 
the absence of a decision on this matter of state law by the highest 
court of the state, decisions of the state superior court upholding the 
constitutionality of the law are binding on a federal court in litigation 
based upon diversity of citizenship." No citation of any such Superior 
Court decision was given, and it was not explained in what context 
the constitutionality of the statute might have come up. 
Two things are remarkable about this statement. Being trial courts 
of county-wide jurisdiction only, and courts the opinions of which 
are not published and often not even written, the Massachusetts Supe-
rior Courts seem to be the kind of courts the decisions of which the 
Supreme Court in King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers2 
expressly held not to be controlling upon the federal courts. The 
Supreme Court there based its decision partly on the ground that 
§1O.3. 1 Acts of 1955, c. 360. 
§lOA. 1222 F.2d 850 (1st Cir. 1955). 
2333 U.S. 153, 68 Sup. Ct. 488, 92 L. Ed. 608 (1948), rehearing denied, 333 U.S. 
878 (1948). 
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courts of this kind 3 do not appear to have such importance within 
the state's own judicial system as to make their decisions authoritative 
expressions of the state's "law," and partly On the great practical 
significance of the difficulty of locating their decisions.4 
Even more unusual in Judge Magruder's treatment of this matter is 
the lack of reference to any concrete decision of these Superior Courts. 
The Erie doctrine imposes a heavy enough limitation by making of 
the federal courts, in diversity cases, oracles of a foreign deity; this 
argument leads still further and would make of these courts oracles 
of a deity unknown. 
S The King decision has recently been followed as regards the Courts of Common 
Pleas in Pennsylvania in two decisions of the Third Circuit. See Kimmel v. Yankee 
Lines, 224 F.2d 644 (1955), and Eckman v. Baker, 224 F.2d 954 (1955). 
4333 u.S. at 160, 68 Sup. Ct. at 493, 92 L. Ed. at 612, wherein the Supreme Court 
noted that the decisions of the South Carolina Courts of Common Pleas were not 
published or digested, but filed only in the counties where the cases are tried, the 
sole index being by the parties' names. 
7
Nekam: Chapter 10: Conflict of Laws
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1955
